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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

LEROY R. CLARK, et al,
Plaintiffs and AppelZants,
Case No. 9005

vs.
JAMES T. EREKSON, et al
Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS,
CLYDE R. 'THOMPSON and MRS. CLYDE R.
THOMPSON
STATEMEN'T OF FACTS
This case arises as a result of a dispute as to
the width of a lane known as Erekson's lane which
is located in Salt Lake County as an extension of
7th East, running southerly from Vine Street east
of Murray, Utah. 'The evidence shows that a lane
has been open through the area for over 50 years
1
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and now a dispute has arisen as to the proper width
thereof. After taking testimony, the court concluded
that a public road existed and that the reasonable
width of said lane between the properties of the
parties should be 40 ft. in part and 50 ft. the balance of the distance, he having concluded that "such
width is reasonalJly necessary as a public road."
The undisputed facts show that for more than
30 years last past the maximum width of said lane
in front of appellant's property has been 24.6 ft.
'This width has been established by the east fence
line of the defendants' <land and the west fence,
tree and garage line of the plaintiffs' land.
The witnesses may be classified into the following groups as to their testimony relating to the
use of the lane over the past years:
1. Members of the South Cottonwood Ward
and Grant Ward traversed the lane on foot, on
horseback or in buggies in going to and from church.
(R. p. -04, 11. 25-30; R. p. 105, 11. 1-30; R. p. 106,
11. 27-28; R. p. 127, 11 9-12; R. p. 133, 11. 15-30;
R. p. 149, 11. 1-13; R. p. 175, 11. 22-30; R. p. 176,
11. 1-22; R. p. 194, 11. 12-15; R. p. 195, 11. 1-14).
2. Business customers or business associates
of the Erekson dairy farm used the lane in delivering feed or to purchase milk and other dairy products (R. p. 104, 11. 20-25; R. p. 106, 11. 19-24;
R. p. 127, 11. 13-19; R. p. 140, 11. 4-11).
2
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3. Fisherman occasiona'lly used the lane while
fishing in the creek (R. p. 84, 11. 13-24; R. p. 149,
11. 14-19).
4. On rare occasions other persons used the
lane for other purposes ( R. pp. 82-83; R. p. 163, 11.
8-30; R. p. 169, 11. 1-24). Respondent Crabtree
testified that the "public" used the lane ( R. p. 106,
11. 6-7). However, an examination of his testimony
at pages 104 to 106 discloses that the "public" to
him meant 'the church members, the fishermen and
Erekson's customers and business associates. 'That
counsel for the respondents was aware of this apparent defect in proof is demonstrated by his unsuccessful attempts to show that the lane was used
by the customers of a store located north of subject
property (R. p.135, 11.12-30; R. p.164, 11. 6-11).
Six restrictive factors are undisputed in the
record as to the width of use of the lane.
A. 19 to 22 feet long culvert across the lane
immediately north of plaintiff's property has restricted the use to such 19 to 22 feet width as long
as anyone can remember;
B. The Rauscher Pond within the limits of
the plaintiff's property which extended westerly to
the point of the Hne of the plaintiff's trees and fence
which restricted the use of the lane to 24.6 feet up
until about 1925;
3
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C. Approximately 30 years ago the west portion of the Rauscher Pond was filled and within four
or five years thereafter the trees were planted and
the fence erected along its present line and the
existence of the trees, fence and garage along the
west side of plaintiff's property has restricted the
use of the lane to 24.6 feet for the past 30 years;
D. At the crossing of the Cottonwood stream
to the south of plaintiff's property the old Cedar
Post and tree show that the maximum width there
was approximately 22 feet;
E. To the south of the stream in an extension
of the lane the defendants, Erekson, have maintained
two ponds which are 16 feet apart between which
the lane passes and hence have restricted the width
and use of the lane to 16 feet.
F. The defendant, Erekson, has maintained
gates approximately 15 feet in width across the lane
a:t its south termini, which perforce, have restricted
the use of the lane to such width.
This lane is a meandering country alley and
the character of the lane is shown by the photographs Exhibits 1, to 9 inclusive. Attached hereto
as an Appendix are two illustrative plats of the
area showing the restricted nature and use of the
lane and superimposed thereon the effect of the
decree by the Court in widening the same beyond
its former use and purpose.
4
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There is an ancillary factual issue in the proceeding as to the description of the Appellants'
property, in that the court found that a boundary
by acquiescence was established at a point 244.90
feet east of the present quarter corner monument,
whereas the decree quieting title does not exactly
fdllow said line. The finding by the Court is that
the Appellants' trees, fence and garage have been
there at the said line for over 30 years. The conclusion is that a boundary by acquiescence has been
thus established, but the Decree failed to follow
said line. This inadvertance should now be rectified.
STATEMENT OF POIN·TS
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING AND CONCLUDING THAT 'THE WIDTH OF EREKSON'S LANE
IS A PUBLIC ROAD AND SHOULD BE 40 FEET WIDE
IN PART AND 50 FEET IN PART, AS SUCH FINDING IS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE AND THE
LAW.
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING 'THAT
THE USE OF THE LANE HAS BEEN RESTRICTED
BY THE CULVERTS, THE TREES, 'THE PONDS AND
THE GATES, AND HAS NOT EXCEEDED 25 FEET IN
\VIDTH AT ANY TIME.
POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW
IN CONCLUDING THAT ONCE IT HAS FOUND A
PUBLIC RIGHT OF WAY TO EXIST ALONG THE
ESTABLISHED LINE OF THE LANE THAT IT MAY
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BY DECREE WIDEN THE SAME TO SUCH WIDTH
AS 'THE COUR'T DEEMS NOW REASONABLY NECESSARY FOR ITS USE AS A PUBLI'C ROAD IN LIGHT
OF PRESENT VEHICULAR TRAVEL.
POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
THE ·TITLE TO THE PLAINTIFF'S PROPERTY
SHOULD BE QUIE'TED ALONG 'THE LINE OF THE
BOUNDARY LINE AS SHOWN BY THE TREES, GARAGE, AND FENCE BEING 244.90 FEET EAST OF THE
PRESENT QUARTER CORNER MONUMENT (OR
204.90 FEET EAST OF THE OLD MONUMENT) AS
REFLECTED BY THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.

AR'GUMEN'T
POINT I.
THE COURT E'RRED IN FINDING AND CONCLUDING THAT THE WIDTH OF EREKSON'S LANE
IS A PUBLIC ROAD AND SHOULD BE 40 FEET WIDE
IN PART AND 50 FEET IN PART, AS SUCH FINDING IS CON'TRARY TO THE EVI'DENCE AND THE
LAW.

The decree of the trial court adjudges that a
north-south public road (called Erekson Lane) extends along the west 'boundary of the property described in paragraph 1. a. of the decree (hereinafter called "subject property") and that said lane
is fifty feet in width a:t certain points and forty
feet in width a:t certain points as it passes subject
property. A portion of this iane is shown in Exhibits
1 to 5, 8 and 9 in relation to subject property. Exhibits 2, 3, 4 and 8 are pictures taken from the
north looking south 'and show a row of trees in line
6
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with the side of a garage abutting the east side
of the lane. Exhibits 1, 5 and 9 are pictures taken
from the south looking north and show the abutting
trees and garage from the opposite direction.
The public road decreed to exist includes not
only the travelled portion of the lane shown in said
exhibits but also an untravelled area ranging in
width from about fifteen to twenty-five feet extending eas't of and including said row of trees and
garage. Appellant Clyde R. Thorn pson asserts : A
The evidence fails to support the finding and decree that Erekson Lane is a public road, and B Assuming Erekson Lane is a public road, there is no
evidence to support the finding and decree as to the
untravelled area.
A

The evidence fails to support the finding and
decree that Erekson Lane is a public road. The Utah
statute governing the dedication of public streets
by use (27-1-2 U.C.A. 1953) provides that "a highway shall be deemed dedicated and abandoned to
the use of the public when it has been continuously
used as a public thoroughfare for a period of ten
years." While the record contains substantial evidence that the lane has been and now is being
regularly used by certain limited classes of persons,
it does not contain evidence of use by the general
pub'lic sufficient to constitute the lane a public road.
7
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The record shows that the following persons have
used the lane over the years for the purposes indicated:
1. Members of the South Cdttonwood Ward
and Grant Ward traversed the lane on foot, on horseback or in buggies in going to and from church;
2. Business customers or business associates
of the Erekson dairy farm used 'the lane in delivering feed or to purchase milk and other dairy products;
3. Fishermen occasionally used the lane while
fishing in the creek;
4. On rare occasions other persons used the
lane for other purposes. Respondent Crabtree testified that the "public" used the lane ( R. p. 106, 11.
6-7). However, an examination of his testimony
discloses that the "public" to him meant the church
members, the fishermen and Erekson's customers
and business associates. That counsel for the respondents was aware of this apparent defect in proof
is demonstrated by his unsuccessful attempts to show
that the lane was used by the customers of a store
'located north of subject property (R. p. 135, 11.
12-30; R. p. 164, 11. 6-11).
The use of a road by a few individuals but not
by the public generally does not create a public
highway by prescriptive use (Harris v. Schwartz,
115 N. E. 345). The use of a road by employees,
8
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customers and business associates does not constitute it a public highway (Thompson v. Nelson, 273
P. 2d 720, Utah, 1954). This court in the Thompson
case quoted with approval the fol'lowing definition
of what constitutes a thoroughfare:
"'A "thoroughfare" is a place or way
through which there is passing or travel. It
becomes a "public thoroughfare" when the
public have a general right of passage. Under
this statute the highway, even 'though it be
over privately owned ground, will be deemed
dedicated or abandoned to the public use when
the public has continuously used it as a thoroughfare for a period of ten years, but such
use must be by the public. Use under private
right is not sufficient. If the thoroughfare is
laid out or used as a private way, its use,
however, long, as a private way, does not
make it a public way; and the mere fact that
the public also make use of it, without objection from the owner of the ;land, will not make
i't a public way. Before it becomes public in
character the ovrner of the land must consent
to the change. Elliott, Roads and Streets, No.
5.' "
The record is barren of evidence that the ''public" has used Erekson Lane for ten continuous years
so as to cons'ti tu te it a public road. 'The use of the
lane by neighboring church friends, employees, customers and business associates was obviously permissive not hostile, particularly in view of the regular use at intervals of the gates. The sporadic use
9
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of the lane by fishermen in season or the occasional
use by others is whorly insufficient to support a
finding and decree of a public road.
B

Assuming Erekson Lane is a public road, there
is no evidence to support the finding and decree as
to the untravelled area. The uncontradicted evidence
detailed below is that prior to 1925 to 1930 the socalled "R'auscher" pond extended west of its present
location (shown in Exhibits 3 and 8 to approximately the line of said row of trees. A fence guarded
the pond on the west at that time. Between 1925
and 1930, a portion of the pond was filled in and
its western edge moved eastward fourteen or fifteen
feet to its approximate present location shown in
said Exhibits 3 and 8. When the pond was filled
in the fence was moved east to about the location
of the fence shown in said Exhibits 3 and 8. Not
over four or five years after these changes occurred,
the row of trees was planted abutting the east side
of the ilane along the approxima:te line of the former
pond edge and the garage was moved to its present
location.
The following testimony and findings corroborate the above recitals :
Joseph Gillam who has lived in the neighborhood since he was a boy (R. p. 133, 11. 4-5) testified
10
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that between 1888 and 1910 there were fences but
no trees on both sides of the lane north of the creek
(R. p. 137, 11, 1-30). Horace Godfrey used the lane
from 1890 to 1903 (R. p. 162, 11. 10-18) and testified there was a fence on the Rauscher's (east)
side of the lane and that when he took loads of hay
into the Rauscher's barn during haying he would
have to "turn with vigor, just within a short dis.tance up there, into the barn" ( R. p. 164, 11. 1219). Godfrey said there was a pond on the west
side of the Rauscher place next to the lane; that
the lane was sixteen to twenty feet wide where it
crossed the creek (R. p. 166, 11. 11-26); and that
the culvert 'beneath the lane was the same width
(R. p. 168, 11. 2-11). Irene Littson Ottley who
used the lane as far back as 1892 remembered the
Rauscher pond and could not remember when it was
constructed. She said there were fences on both
side of the lane north of the creek between ft and
Vine Street (R. p. 170, 11. 4-15). Defendant J. T.
Erekson stated the so-called Rauscher pond at one
time extended further west than it now does; that
Shafer filled in a portion of the pond, moving the
west edge of the pond east and at the same time
moved the fence east (R. p. 178, 11. 14-24). Brent
Gaufin remembered .that 'before the pond was filled
in, the west edge extended approximately to where
the row of trees shown on Exh:i!bit P3 now is ( R.
ll
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p. 145, 11. 25-30). Gaufin said that between 1925
and 19'30 the west edge of the pond was moved
eastward approximately fourteen to fifteen feet (R.
p. 146, 11. 10-30) and that before this change occurred the lane was approximately twenty-five fee't
wide between the west edge of the pond (the present
tree line) and the west side of the lane (R. p. 151,
11. 9-13). Plaintiff Leroy R. Clark moved to said
property in August, 1935 (R. p. 77, 11. 12-13) and
said that at that time there was a fence post at the
"end of the last tree" in front of the garage ( R. p.
88, 11. 11-27). Based on this evidence the court
found:
''Prior to the planting of the trees and
erection of the garage, plaintiffs' predecessor in title maintained a pond which presently exists but which extended Westerly to
the line described in the preceding paragraph
un!til it was filled about 30 years ago." (R.
p. 64)
Defendant J. T. Erekson testified that the
garage shown in Exhibits 1, 2, 3 and 4 was placed
in its present position and the row of trees was
planted some time between 1925 and 1930 and have
been in place since ·then ( R. p. 179, 11. 3-30) . Brent
Gaufin also testified that said trees were planted
between 1925 and 1930 (R. p. 143, 11. 15-29) and
that the garage moved to its present location after
1930 (R. p. 144, 11. 1-5). Based upon that and
12
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other testimony, the court found, and properly so,
that "for more than thirty years last past the plaintiffs have had, established and maintained a garage,
trees, and a fence along the west line of the property
described in paragraph 2 above" (R. p. 63). 'There
is no evidence that the pub'lic has made any use
of the area east of said row of trees since they were
planted.
Except for a period of not over four or five
years the east line of Erekson Lane, as it passes
subject property, has been marked either by the
row of trees and the west side of the garage shown
in said exhibits or by the pond edge which formerly
extended out to the present tree line and which was
surrounded by a fence. There is no evidence whatsoever that the un traveiled area east of said tree
line has ever been used by the public. It could not
have been used prior to 1925-1930 because of the
pond and fence nor afterward because of the trees
and garage. This un traveiled area may have been
used during 'the four or five year period between
the filling in of the pond and the planting of the
trees although there is no evidence to prove it. Even
if it were used during this period, the use was not
of sufficient duration to establish a public road.
Since the record is clear and the findings confirm the fact that Eerekson Lane where it passes
the so-caHed Rauscher pond (even assuming the
13
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land is a public street) could never have exceeded its
present width (approximately twenty-five feet) except possibly for an interval of four or five years,
the decree of the court tha:t the lane at tha;t point is
either forty or fifty feet wide must, as to the untravelled portion east of the tree line, be based upon
something other than actual use. Perhaps the court's
error arose from a misinterpretation and misapplication of the principle state in Lindsay Land &
Live Stock Co. v. Churnos, 285 Pac. 646, and Jeremy
v. Bertagnole, 116 P. 2d 420, that the width of a
public highway created through ten years of continuous public use would be that reasonable and
necessary for the uses which were made of the road
and 'that the width would not be limited to the area
actually used. If that is the basis of the court's
decision as 'to the untraveled area, the court erred
for the following reasons:
First: Under 'the facts and circumstances of
this case a right-of-way the width of the area now
travelled and used is all that is reasonable and
necessary for the uses which have been made of the
lane; and
Second: 'The above princple is inappiiC'able
here since the abutting land never actually used by
the public as a right-of-way is occupied by valual1le
im provemen'ts.
14
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POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
THE USE OF THE LANE HAS BEEN RESTRICTED
BY THE 'CULVERTS, THE TREES, THE PONDS AND
THE GATES, AND HAS NOT EXCEEDED 25 FEET IN
WIDTH AT ANY TIME.

Erekson Lane is an irregularly-shaped, meandering country lane which prior to the advent of
automobiles was used principally by pedestrians
and horseback riders and some buggies and wagons.
The lane is now occasionally used by automobiles
although such use has been rare because of the lack
of a vehicular bridge across the creek. About 'the
only vehicles that now use the lane are those belonging to the customers and business associates
of the Erekson dairy (R. pp. 104-106). During
fishing season some cars pull into the lane and park
while the occupants are fishing (R. p. 84, 11. 13-24).
Very few automobiles use the lane as a means of
getting from Vine Street to 59th South. Clark testified 'that during the more than twenty years he
lived there he occasionally crossed the creek and
drove to 59th Sou'th from his place but that he seldom saw other cars driving through (R. p. 84, 11.
3-12). The reason for this is obvious since the public would not reasonably be expected to use a narrow
dirt country lane often closed by gates which crosses
an open unbridged ditch when there are wide public
highways available for use nearby (Exhibit 14).
l!)
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The lane in its present condition is whol'ly adequate for the uses to which it has been pu't. No one
has ever complained that it is inadequate. The vehicles that use it come and go without difficulty
except possibly when they get stuck in 'the ditch and
that circumHtances of course has no relationship to
the width of the lane. On the occasions when the
county has had equipment in the lane it has been
able 'to maneuver without any reported difficulty.
The lane in its present condition is wide enough
for two vehicles to pass (R. p. 123, 11. 14-19).
'The attention of the court is directed to the
attached appP-ndix which are illustrative plats. Particularly there are six restrictive factors which
obviate any possible 1egitima:te claim of a public
road over 24.6 feet wide.
a. 19 to 22 feet long culvert across the lane
immediately north of plaintiff's property
which has restricted the use to such 19 to 22
feet width as long as anyone can remember;
b. The Rauscher Pond within the limits of
the plaintiff's property which extended westerly !to the point of the line of the plaintiff's
trees and fence which restricted the use of
the lane to 24.6 feet up until about 1925;
c. Approximately 30 years ago the west portion of the Rauscher Pond was filled and
within four or five years thereafter the trees
were planted and the fence erected along its
present line and the existence of the trees,
fence and garage along the west side of plaintiff's property has restricted the use of the
lane to 24.6 feet for the past 30 years;
1

lf'
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d. At. the crossing of the Cottonwood stream
to the south of plaintiff's property the old
Cedar Post and tree show that the maximum
·width there was approximately 22 feet;
e. 'To the south of the stream in an extension
of 'the lane the defendants, Erekson, have
maintained two ponds w·hich are 16 feet apart
have restricted 'the width and use of the lane
to 16 feet.
f. The defendant, Erekson, has maintained
gates approximately 15 feet in width across
the lane at its south termini, which perforce,
havP- restricted the use of 'the lane to such
width.
~These

six obstacles are of long standing and
have utterly prohibited a "public or o'ther use of
the lane in excess of the 24.6 ft. width." The fence
line of respondents along the west side of the lane
has been there for more years than anyone cared
to state. 'This has fixed the west line apparently
though the logic of the district court! s decree would
permit this to 1be moved over as readily as appellants' trees, garage and fence to accommodate the
width which the 'trial court feels might be more
desirable for present automotive travel.
This country lane fords the Cottonwood Creek.
In 'the winter no one tries to run a car through the
snow and the creek too. There was no evidence of
such win'ter travel through the creek. In the spring,
during the runoff, the lane is impassible because
of high waters. At the point where the lane enters
17
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the Cottonwood Creek heading south, there is an
old cedar post just 21 feet east from the respondents'
fence line. Mr. Clark testified as to a special examination and measurement of the same made during
the course of the trial.
It is respectfully suggested there is no valid
legal basis upon which the court can decree a rightof-way greater in width than the used and travelled
area when for the past seventy or eighty years the
lane as it now exists has adequately served the purposes for which it has been used without difficulty
or complaint.
It is dbvious that the defendants are now attempting by means other than appropriate condemnation proceedings to expand what is and always
has been a narrow, quiet, little-used country lane
into a city street. On cross-examination defendant
Marlowe L. Cra:btree testified as follows:

'''Q. That is your property, that is what
you claim?
A. Yes, but I don't want it for any purpose other than a road.
Q. You just want it for a road?
A. I want to open that road, we all
want.
Q. You want to make that road in
there?
A. Yes.
18
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Q. Now when you make that road, are
you going to make that middle line, and make
it half here and half here (indicating), or
do you want to leave the road as it is now?
A. From my east fenceline, I want to go
as far east as the Judge wouild allow us, a:t
least 50 feet, and if they make it four roads,
it would be fine." ( R. p. 121, 1. 30; R. p. 122,
11. 1-12)
Later Crabtree testified:
"Q. Is it 50 feet wide along all the way
it runs?
A. I haven't measured.
Q. Well, approximately. You can 'tell
about what 50 feet is.
A. We would like to have it.
Q. Running even across hills, or do you
want to make it straight?
A. I don't know. It is other people'sStraight. I think I would go along just definitely in opening up that lane anywhere you
want it.
Q. You want to make it a County road
through there?
A. Yes.
Q. O.K. 50 feet wide, you want to make
it?
A. I wouild like four roads." (R. p. 126,
11. 2-15)
It is significant that as late as 1953 defendant
Erekson asserted to plaintiff Clark that Erekson
19
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Lane was a private lane and that Clark would have
no right to use it in reaching a tract which he had
reserved in conveying to Thompson (R. p. 185, 11.
26-30; R. p. 186, 11. 1-5; R. p. 189, 11. 17-20;
R. p. 208, 11. 22-30; R. p. 209, 11. 1-8). Yet for
reasons best known to Erekson he had at the trial
changed his position and then asserted that the
lane was and always had been a public street.
POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED AS A 1\/fATTER OF LAW
IN CONCLUDING THAT ONCE IT HAS FOUND A
PUBLIC RIGH'T OF WAY TO EXIST ALONG THE
ESTABLISHED LINE OF THE LANE THAT IT MAY
BY DECREE WIDEN THE SAME TO SUCH WIDTH
AS 'THE COURT DEEMS NOW REASONABLY NECESSARY FOR rTS USE AS A PUBLIC ROAD IN LIGHT
OF PRE,SENT VEHICULAR TRAVEL.

The effect of the court's decision is to enlarge
the above principle to mean that the width of a road
created by public use is that vvidth which is reasonably necessary for the purposes for which it might
be used in the future rather than for the purposes
established by prior public use. That this court did
not intend such a result is illustrated by the statement in Jer.emy v. Bertagnole that "A bridal path
abandoned to the public may not be expanded by
court decree into a boulevard.''

B.
Appellants contend the principle developed in
20
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the above cases is inapplicable here not only because
the travelled area is adequate for the uses to which
the lane has been put but also because of the different circumstances involved. In those cases the asserted public road was across open grazing land.
Here the land is a heavily wooded rural residentiaJl
and farming area. Except in the one instance noted
below, the roads there involved do not appear to
have been bounded by fences. 'There is a fence here.
In neither of those cases does it appear that there
were valuable buildings, trees or other improvements owned by the abutting land owner in conflict
with the decreed public road. Here a valuable garage
and full-grown shade trees over thirty years old
conflict with the decreed right-of-way. In both of
those cases the road was regularly used for the
trai'ling of sheep or cattle and in using the road
for this purpose an area greater in width than 'the
decreed public road was used. The use of Erekson
Lane has been limited to pedestrian, equestrian and
some vehicular traffic. Under the circumstances of
the Lindsay and Jeremy cases the courts' refusal
to limlt the declared width of the public road to the
width of the observable use (sixteen feet in the
Jeremy case) is understandable and has reason.
However, to enforce the court's decree here will be
unreasonable and will irreparably damage appellant by requiring the removal of a valualile building
and the beautiful shade trees which greatly enhance
21
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the value of the property and which constitute one
of the chief attractions causing appellant Thompson to purchase it. If a court has the power to so
condemn valuable private property without compensation, what, if any, is the limit to such power? Suppose that instead of the trees and garage there had
been constructed on said land a million dollar structure used by 'the plaintiff and his predecessors in
the conduct of a business permitted by local zoning
ordinances. As is true of the grage and trees, such
bujilding would have been upon land declared by the
court to belong to the plaintiff subject to a public
road although in fact the public has never used the
property. Yet under the court's view, appellant
would be required to remove the 'building without
compensation. Appellant asserts the court has no
such power under our law except as it may be exercised in proper condemnation proceedings where
the appellant can be adequately compensated for his
loss.
A circumstance in the Jeremy case suggests
that the princip'le there applied is modified where
the landowner has improvements on the land abutting the used portion of the road. There the court
declared the road to be sixty feet in width "for a
small fenced portion of its length" and "* * * Five
rods for the remaining portion." If the court in the
J er.emy case had the power which the trial court in
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this case assumes to exercise, why wasn't the public
road decreed to be of uniform width both as to the
fenced and unfenced portion? Obviously the court
considered tha:t different principles governed the
two road segments. Since the existence of fences
enclosing the narrower segment is the only factor to
distinguish it from the wider one, it must be assumed
that the court considered it was, for some reason
related to the fences, precluded from decreeing a
larger width as to the fenced portion. Appellant
submits this reason was that the court recognized it
lacked authority to condemn the area occupied by
the fences v1ithout proper proceedings in which the
abutting land owner could be compensated for his
loss. To do otherwise would constitute a taking of
private property without due process of law contrary to the provisions of Article I, Section 22 of
the Utah Constitution which provides: "Private
property shall not be taken or damaged for public
use without just compensation."
In Whitesides v. Green, 44 Pac. 1032 (Uta:h)
decided April 13, 1896, the evidence was that appellant had on March 25, 1895 constructed a fence
approximately one-half rod inside the boundary of
his property and asserted that the highway in question was only one rod wide. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's holding that the road was
three rods wide and had been established through
23
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fifteen years uninterrupted use by the public. The
effect of that decision would be to require the removal of the fence located on appellant's property.
However, unlike ·this case, the fence there was located after the public road had been created.
In Burrows v. Guest, 12 Pac. 84 7 (Utah 1887)
the Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court's
holding that the question of whether a public road
existed should have been submitted to the jury. The
court by dictum said that the existence of a :formal
recorded plat of survey showing the width of a road
would be strong evidence in determining the area
dedicated for public road purposes and by implication approved the action of the road supervisor in
removing shrubs and trees from an area within a
platted street but off the regularly used portion of
the street. However, here the official plat does not
show Erekson Lane and the evidence clearly demonstrates that the public has never used the untravelled portion of said decreed public road.
1

We are not unmindful of the Boyer v. Clark
decision 326 Pac (2) 107, 7 Ut. (2d) 395 wherein
the Middle Canyon Road was decreed to be a public
road. 'Therein the court remanded the case for a
de termination by the trial court, "the width of the
highway, which must be determined in accordance
wi th what is reasonable and necessary for the uses
to which the road has been put." The trial court
1
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was spared the necessity of making a determination
in that case because the parties proceeded to stipulate as to width.
However, in our present case, the trial court
here construed the Boy.er v. Clark case decision to
require that he fix a width for the Erekson Lane
to accommodate automotive traffic far in excess
of any present or past use. It is now proper lhat
your court clear up this matter and relieve the
trial courts from their misapprehension that on
'their shoulders rests the right and responsibility
to widen a path, a lane or a country road in to a
modern boulevard.
POINT IV.
'THE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING 'THAT
THE TITLE TO THE PLAINTIFF'S PROPERTY
SHOULD BE QUIETED ALONG 'THE LINE OF TH'E
BOUNDARY LINE AS SHOWN BY THE 'TREE'S, GARAGE, AND FENCE BEING 244.90 FEET EAST OF THE
PRESENT QUARTER CORNER MONUMENT (OR
204.90 FEET EAST OF THE OLD MONUMEN'T) .A:S
REFLECTED BY THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.

The court found that for more than thirty years
the appellants have had established and n1aintained
a garage, trees and a fence along the west line of
subject property and concluded that said line of
trees, garage and fence established the boundary
between the property of appellan ts and respondents
by use and acquiescence ( R. pp. 63, 65). The respon1
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dents do not question this portion of the court's findings and conclusions. The property described in
paragraph 1. a. of the decree quieting title in apellant Clyde R. 'Thompson excludes a strip of land
north of said garage 0.757 rods wide and 14.706
rods long which lies east of said decreed line separating plain tiffs' and defendants' property. It is
requested, therefor, that the decree be altered to
conform with the findings of fact and conclusions
of law hy changing the description in said paragraph 1. a. to include said omitted strip of land.
1
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CONCLUSION
This case clearly presents two basic legal principles:
(a) Does the occasional permissive use of
a lane over a restricted width (not over 24.6
feet) establish a public use and measure the
extent of the possible easement; or
(b) May a trial court, after finding a limited public use of a lane, expand that narrow
lane into a modern highway by decreeing a
width "reasonably necessary" for traffic.
We submit that the court should now refuse
such unfettered power of taking land without just
or any compensation. 'The Decree as to the width of
!the lane should be modified to 24.6 feet and the long
acquiesced boundary shou ld be corrected to conform
with 'the findings and conclusions.
1

Respectfully submitted,
PUGSLEY, HAYES,
RAMPTON & WA'TKIS'S
721 Cont"l Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellants,
Clyde R. Thompson and
Mrs. Clyde R. 'Thompson
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